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Beyond Trademarks and Offense: Tam and
the Justices’ Evolution on Free Speech
Clay Calvert*

When the Supreme Court steps up to the plate in a case like Matal
v. Tam involving free-speech protection of offensive expression, the
justices have options about just how hard to swing the judicial bat.1
First Amendment advocates, of course, hope they’ll swing for the
fences and crush free-expression grand slams. Cohen v. California,
protecting the display of an offensive jacket in a courthouse corridor and propelled by memorable lines like “one man’s vulgarity
is another’s lyric,” was one such home run, soaring over a dissent
and past the outfield wall of censorship.2 Other times, the Court
merely drops a bunt and barely advances the First Amendment
score, if at all.
In Tam, the Supreme Court threw out the “disparagement clause”
of the Lanham Act, the federal trademark law, because trademarks
are private speech and thus regulating them based on government
determinations of offensiveness violates the First Amendment. The
solid outcome here—a virtual triple, as described later—contrasts
with the narrow, incremental results in some other recent First
Amendment cases that reached the Court.

* Professor & Joseph L. Brechner Eminent Scholar in Mass Communication and
Director of the Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project at the University of
Florida. Also part of the Brief of Amici Curiae Cato Institute and a Basket of Deplorable People and Orgs. in Support of Petitioner, Lee v. Tam, No. 15-1293. Note that PTO
Director Michelle Lee resigned shortly before the case was decided, with Joseph Matal
now serving as acting director, so Lee v. Tam became Matal v. Tam.

1 Admittedly, a baseball analogy featuring the Court batting strikes out against
Chief Justice John Roberts’s testimony during his confirmation hearings that “it’s my
job to call balls and strikes, and not to pitch or bat.” Todd S. Purdum & Robin Toner,
Roberts Pledges He’ll Hear Cases with ‘Open Mind,’ N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 2015, at A1.
2

403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
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Consider Federal Communications Commission v. Fox Television Stations, a case regarding fleeting expletives and momentary nudity
on broadcast television.3 The Supreme Court had an opportunity to
score two runs for the First Amendment—to abolish the FCC’s regulatory authority over broadcast indecency (thereby reversing the
aging 1978 Pacifica decision arising from the George Carlin filthywords case4) and to strike down its definition of indecency as unconstitutionally vague. But the Court waved off both pitches.
Instead, it resolved the case “on fair notice grounds under the Due
Process Clause.”5 The Court determined that the FCC had impermissibly
changed its indecency policy to target fleeting expletives and isolated
sexual images without giving networks Fox and ABC proper notice of
the switch. As for the free speech issue, the Court simply reminded the
FCC—perhaps with an eyebrow arched—that the commission should
feel “free to modify its current indecency policy in light of its determination of the public interest and applicable legal requirements.”6
Did the FCC heed that suggestion? No. Although it put out a notice
for public comment about its indecency policy shortly thereafter and
said it would target only egregious indecency incidents,7 it failed to
take substantive action. Today, the FCC’s indecency policy remains
what it was when the Court decided Fox Television Stations five years
ago. The First Amendment issues are left waiting for another day
and another case, perhaps the product of Chief Justice John Roberts’s
general penchant for minimalism and avoidance.8
Or take—with more relevance, as it happens, for Tam—the Court’s
2015 decision in Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans.9
3
4
5
6

567 U.S. 239 (2012).

Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
Fox Television Stations, 567 U.S. at 258.
Id. at 259.

See Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, FCC Reduces Backlog of
Broadcast Indecency Complaints by 70% (More Than One Million Complaints); Seeks
Comment on Adopting Egregious Cases Policy (Apr. 1, 2013), https://apps.fcc.gov/
edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-13-581A1.pdf.
7

8 See generally Clay Calvert & Matthew D. Bunker, Fissures, Fractures & Doctrinal
Drifts: Paying the Price in First Amendment Jurisprudence for a Half Decade of Avoidance, Minimalism & Partisanship, 24 Wm. & Mary Bill of Rts. J. 943, 957 (2016) (analyzing “how philosophies of minimalism and avoidance have detrimentally affected First
Amendment doctrines since Justice Kagan joined the Roberts Court”).
9
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The odious speech there consisted of a proposed specialty license
plate bearing the Confederate battle flag. Its censor, in turn, was
the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles Board, which rejected the
plate because “many members of the general public find the design
offensive.”10 Would the Court hit a First Amendment homer and declare this a seemingly easy case of viewpoint discrimination violating core free-speech principles?
No. Instead, the five-justice majority—a bloc of four liberal-leaning
justices (Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor and
Elena Kagan) joined by Clarence Thomas—completely whiffed. Falling back on something called the government-speech doctrine, the
majority held that messages on specialty license plates are speech of
the government, not the private groups—in Walker, the Sons of Confederate Veterans—that design and sponsor them. And when the
government speaks, the First Amendment has little application; the
government can say what it likes, delete messages it doesn’t like, and
engage in viewpoint discrimination. As Justice Breyer wrote for the
majority, “government statements (and government actions and programs that take the form of speech) do not normally trigger the First
Amendment rules designed to protect the marketplace of ideas.”11 Labeling a mode of expression “government speech” gives the government a free pass to discriminate against viewpoints it deems noxious.
Justice Samuel Alito, joined in dissent by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy, bristled at applying
the government speech doctrine to Texas’s specialty plates. Alito
opined that the messages “proposed by private parties and placed
on Texas specialty plates are private speech, not government speech.
Texas cannot forbid private speech based on its viewpoint. That is
what it did here.”12 For him, expanding the government-speech doctrine to cover specialty plates “establishes a precedent that threatens
private speech that government finds displeasing.”13
At best, Walker proved a fleeting, feel-good win for those who find
Confederate-flag imagery racist. That’s because the script flipped
soon thereafter in North Carolina. The Walker majority’s holding
10
11
12
13

Id. at 2245.

Id. at 2245–46.

Id. at 2263 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2254.
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that specialty plates are government speech sustained the Tar Heel
State’s offering a “Choose Life” specialty plate but denying a prochoice alternative.14 In the simplest of stereotypes, the political left
used the government speech doctrine to thwart a Confederate flag
license plate in Texas, while the political right later used it to stifle
a pro-choice plate in North Carolina. It was political tit-for-tat. At
worst, then, Walker gave government entities an elastic mechanism
for sanctioning viewpoint discrimination and dodging First Amendment challenges.
Then along came Matal v. Tam. It brought back the arguments
about government-assisted speech in a context that invited the Court
to (1) roll back, or at least cabin and confine, Walker’s governmentspeech doctrine; or (2) revisit the issue of whether viewpoint discrimination (normally verboten) becomes acceptable in that setting.
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) has statutory power
to reject registration for marks that “may disparage . . . persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them
into contempt, or disrepute.”15 For example, the PTO used this power
to rebuff the effort of an Oregon-based Asian-American band called
The Slants to register its name as a mark, finding that the name, as
a reference to slanted eyes, had been employed to disparage AsianAmericans. Slants frontman, Simon Tam, countered that the band
was reappropriating the term, wresting away its power, sting, and
stigma from hate mongers.
What is “reappropriation”? In academic parlance, it’s “the process
of taking possession of a slur previously used exclusively by dominant groups to reinforce a stigmatized group’s lesser status.”16 The
Slants explain their meaning more lyrically in “From the Heart,” a
tune about fighting the PTO on the aptly titled album The Band Who
Must Not Be Named:
Sorry if we try too hard
To take some power back for ours.
The language of oppression
14
15

ACLU of North Carolina v. Tennyson, 815 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2016).
15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2017).

Adam D. Galinsky et al., The Reappropriation of Stigmatizing Labels: The Reciprocal Relationship between Power and Self-Labeling, 24 Psychol. Sci. 2020, 2020 (2013).
16
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Will lose to education
Until the words can’t hurt us again.
So sorry if you take offense,
But silence will not make amends.
The system’s all wrong
And it won’t be long
Before the kids are singing our song.17
In December 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
sitting en banc, ruled in The Slants’ favor and struck down the disparagement clause, holding that “the First Amendment forbids government regulators to deny registration because they find the speech
likely to offend others.”18 The appellate court found not only that the
clause was viewpoint-based and could not pass muster under the
rigorous strict-scrutiny standard of review,19 but also that it failed
under the more relaxed intermediate-scrutiny test governing commercial speech. The government petitioned the Supreme Court to
hear the case, and The Slants, despite the Federal Circuit ruling in
their favor, did likewise. The band argued the “issue is undeniably
important. The Court is very likely to address it in the near future,
in another case if not in this one. Meanwhile, respondent Simon Tam
waits in limbo. His trademark rights will not be secure until the
Court resolves this issue once and for all.”20
In September 2016, the Supreme Court agreed to hear what was then
known as Lee v. Tam. It framed the issue simply as whether the disparagement clause “is facially invalid under the Free Speech Clause of
the First Amendment.”21 With The Slants case on its docket, the Court
17 The Slants, From the Heart, on The Band Who Must Not Be Named (In Music We
Trust Records, 2017). Take a listen and look on YouTube at https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=pwfEgcRXJjM.
18

In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

Strict scrutiny requires the government to prove that it has a compelling interest
to support a statute and that the statute is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. See
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011).
19

20 Brief for Respondent at 1, On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Lee v. Tam, No. 15-1293 (June 20, 2016).

21 Question Presented, Matal v. Tam, No. 15-1293 (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.
supremecourt.gov/qp/15-01293qp.pdf.
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denied a petition one week later in Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse. That
case centered on the PTO’s cancellation of six registered marks involving variations of the NFL football team name Washington Redskins as
disparaging to Native Americans. The outcome of the Redskins’ battle
thus would hinge on the result in The Slants case.
Saving its Tam decision until the penultimate week of its term,
the Court on June 19, 2017 delivered what would have amounted to
a First Amendment home run if not for some unfortunate four-tofour fracturing among the justices on logic and reasoning regarding
viewpoint discrimination. Call it a triple.
All eight justices (newbie Neil Gorsuch played no part) agreed
on the pro-free-speech outcome—that the disparagement clause, as
Justice Alito wrote in announcing the Court’s judgment, “offends a
bedrock First Amendment principle: Speech may not be banned on
the ground that it expresses ideas that offend.”22 That’s an extremely
close paraphrase of the Court’s reasoning nearly 30 years earlier
protecting flag-burning as political speech.23 It’s also a clear winner
for The Slants, the Redskins and other provocatively named groups
seeking federal trademark registration like Dykes on Bikes,24 as well
as more generally for free-speech advocates everywhere. Indeed,
shortly after the ruling, Simon Tam called it “a win for all marginalized groups. It can’t be a win for free speech if some people benefit
and others don’t. The First Amendment protects speech even that we
disagree with.”25
22

Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017).

See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”).
23

24 Like The Slants, the San Francisco Dykes on Bikes Women’s Motorcycle Contingent
had fought lengthy registration battles with the PTO, which contended that “dykes”
disparages lesbians. Somewhat echoing The Slants argument regarding reappropriation, Dykes on Bikes filed a friend-of-the-court brief in Tam arguing that “[a] trademark
allows Dykes on Bikes to identify as a group by using language that invokes the members’ own identities. That ability to associate individual identity with group identity
and communicate a message unique to that group is central to the First Amendment.”
Brief of Amicus Curiae San Francisco Dykes on Bikes Women’s Motorcycle Contingent,
Inc., Matal v. Tam, No. 15-1293, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 3872, at 10–11 (June 19, 2017).

25 Joe Coscarelli, Why the Slants Took a Fight over Their Band Name to the Supreme
Court, N.Y. Times, June 19, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/19/arts/music/slants-name-supreme-court-ruling.html.
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Thus, the constitutional outcome in Tam is not groundbreaking. Rather, it is principles-affirming: there is no categorical
carve-out from First Amendment protection for either offensive
or hateful speech, and viewpoint discrimination—something
Justice Kennedy took pains to reinforce in a concurrence—is
anathema to the First Amendment unless the government is
speaking.
A close read of the trio of opinions in Tam reveals, however, at least
seven other points that may affect future rulings in First Amendment disputes. Before addressing those items, a quick breakdown of
the three opinions provides critical context:
1. Justice Alito wrote for a unanimous Court in some parts
(most significantly, regarding government speech), for
seven justices in another, and—critically—on behalf of
only four justices (himself, Roberts, Thomas, and Breyer)
in several sections;
2. Justice Kennedy agreed with the judgment but wrote a
concurrence, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor,
and Kagan, centering on viewpoint discrimination and
contending that a tighter focus on that concept would
have eliminated the need for the other four justices to
address other issues; and
3. Justice Thomas joined Alito’s opinion in all but one
rather non-crucial part and wrote separately to reiterate his prior position that commercial speech cases
should be evaluated under strict, not intermediate,
scrutiny.
As this breakdown suggests, the biggest rift in reasoning was
between the Alito bloc on the one hand and the Kennedy bloc on
the other. Although all eight justices agreed the law was viewpoint
based, the former group delved into questions that the latter, by
maintaining a crisper focus on viewpoint discrimination, would
have jettisoned. Indeed, as argued later, Kennedy’s concurrence
provides a more clear, elegant articulation of when a statute is viewpoint based and, in turn, of the power of the doctrine against viewpoint discrimination to shut down other long-shot, statute-saving
arguments.
Packingham v. North Carolina—another First Amendment freespeech decision issued the same day as Tam—displayed a nearly
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identical fracturing.26 In Packingham, the Court struck down a state
statute that banned registered sex offenders from using online social media services such as Facebook. Delivering the Court’s opinion, Justice Kennedy once again was joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Sotomayor, and Kagan, as well as Breyer. Similarly, Justice Alito was
joined again by Roberts and Thomas, this time in a concurrence objecting to the Kennedy bloc’s “unnecessary rhetoric” and “undisciplined dicta” about the importance of preserving the Internet and
social media networks as venues for expression.
In brief, Kennedy and Alito each authored opinions in Tam
and Packingham that agreed with a pro-free-speech result. Yet the
Kennedy-authored opinions in both Tam (a concurrence) and Packingham (the Court’s opinion) (1) were joined by all of the ostensibly
liberal-leaning justices (save for Breyer in Tam), and (2) failed to gain
traction with a three-justice bloc of ostensible conservatives (Alito,
Roberts, and Thomas). Kennedy’s penchant for grandiose statements
about the importance of free speech—something predating Tam and
Packingham27—may have driven a wedge between him and, as explained shortly below, the typically less free-speech friendly Alito.
The seven points—not necessarily in order of importance—from
Tam that might affect future First Amendment speech cases in contexts beyond trademark law are these: (1) Justice Alito actually can
pen an opinion protecting offensive expression; (2) Justice Breyer
doesn’t always go off into the balancing weeds of proportionality or
denigrate fundamental First Amendment doctrines; (3) nary a justice
26

137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017).

Kennedy often extols the value of free expression with rhetorical flourishes. See,
e.g., Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1682 (2015) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(“First Amendment protections are both personal and structural. Free speech begins
with the right of each person to think and then to express his or her own ideas. Protecting this personal sphere of intellect and conscience, in turn, creates structural safeguards for many of the processes that define a free society.”); United States v. Alvarez,
567 U.S. 709, 727 (2012) (“The remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true. This
is the ordinary course in a free society. The response to the unreasoned is the rational;
to the uninformed, the enlightened; to the straight-out lie, the simple truth.”); Ashcroft
v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (“The right to think is the beginning
of freedom, and speech must be protected from the government because speech is the
beginning of thought.”); Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672,
701 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The First Amendment is often inconvenient. But
that is beside the point. Inconvenience does not absolve the government of its obligation to tolerate speech.”).
27
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fell to the pox of political correctness, even though the outcome of
the Redskins case was resting in the balance and the floodgates were
predicted to burst open with disparaging registered marks; (4) there
was united pushback against the government-speech doctrine,
stretching it beyond Walker; (5) the commercial-speech doctrine,
premised on intermediate scrutiny review, someday may yet fall by
the wayside; (6) while the whole Court agrees that viewpoint discrimination is wrong, justices conceptualize it differently and assign
it differing degrees of importance; and (7) faith among the justices
in the venerable marketplace-of-ideas theory remains remarkably
strong in the digital age. Here’s a more extended take on each item.

Alito Rides to the Defense of Offense
In Snyder v. Phelps, the Supreme Court came to the defense of the
Westboro Baptist Church and ruled for its right to engage in anti-gay,
anti-family, and anti-military speech near a funeral for a U.S. soldier
killed in Iraq. Only one justice dissented: Samuel Alito. “Our profound national commitment to free and open debate is not a license
for the vicious verbal assault that occurred in this case,” he wrote,
explaining why he would have ruled for the plaintiff’s tort claims
against Westboro.28
One year prior, in United States v. Stevens, the Court nullified as
overbroad a federal law targeting so-called crush videos depicting
the killing and mutilation of animals. There again, only one justice
dissented: Samuel Alito. “The Court strikes down in its entirety a
valuable statute . . . that was enacted not to suppress speech, but to
prevent horrific acts of animal cruelty—in particular, the creation
and commercial exploitation of ‘crush videos,’ a form of depraved
entertainment that has no social value,” Alito opined.29
Alito also authored a dissent—this one joined by Justices Scalia
and Thomas—in United States v. Alvarez. The Court there applied the
“most exacting scrutiny” to declare unconstitutional the Stolen Valor
Act, which made it a federal crime to lie about having won a Congressional Medal of Honor. “The lies covered by the Stolen Valor Act
have no intrinsic value and thus merit no First Amendment protection unless their prohibition would chill other expression that falls
28
29

Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 463 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting).

United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 482 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting).
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within the Amendment’s scope,” Alito wrote.30 Foreshadowing the
Alito-versus-Kennedy opinions in Tam and Packingham, Alito’s Alvarez dissent took aim at the Kennedy-authored plurality opinion.
I asserted several years ago that it seemed Alito was “trying to
change . . . First Amendment jurisprudence when it comes to offensive speech that he perceives to be of low value . . . in order to meet
his own subjective standards of decency, civility, and substantive
importance of expression.”31 Or, as Professor Mary-Rose Papandrea
more recently and succinctly put it, “Alito does not have a track record as a particularly speech-protective Justice.”32
But in Tam, he proved quite capable of writing an opinion protecting offensive speech that won over, in various parts, a majority
and plurality of his fellow justices. That’s excellent news from a freespeech perspective, but does it mean that Alito has changed his First
Amendment stripes?
That’s highly doubtful. Alito’s opinion in Tam, I suspect, was really about thwarting political correctness, even if the disparagement
clause had been on the books since 1946, decades before “PC” became a term. This anti-PC motivation is evident when Alito derisively dubs the statute “a happy-talk clause” and when he attacks the
government’s argument that it “has an interest in preventing speech
expressing ideas that offend.” Quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.,
Alito retorts that “[s]peech that demeans on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, age, disability, or any other similar ground is
hateful; but the proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence is
that we protect the freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate.’”33
Alito’s defense of Confederate flags on specialty license plates in his
Walker dissent similarly reflects an anti-political-correctness stance;
he was defending the right to display a polysemic symbol vilified by
the political left.

30

United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 739 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting).

Clay Calvert, Justice Samuel A. Alito’s Lonely War against Abhorrent, Low-Value
Expression: A Malleable First Amendment Philosophy Privileging Subjective Notions
of Morality and Merit, 40 Hofstra L. Rev. 115, 169 (2011).
31

32 Mary-Rose Papandrea, Free Speech Foundations Symposium: The Government
Brand, 110 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1195, 1197 (2016).

33 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764 (2017) (quoting United States v. Schwimmer,
279 U. S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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For Alito, battling perceived political correctness in Tam and
Walker is a far more important—and decidedly different—cause
than safeguarding speech that (1) harms a grieving father—a private figure, no less—at his son’s funeral (Snyder); (2) depicts helpless
animals victimized by humans’ sadistic sexual fetishes (Stevens); and
(3) degrades the honor, as embodied by medals, of some of the bravest individuals who heroically fought enemy forces in the nation’s
wars (Alvarez). Those factual differences are probably pertinent for
Alito in distinguishing Tam and Walker from Snyder, Stevens, and
Alvarez. In brief, Alito’s First Amendment stance in Tam may not cut
across the free-speech playing field.

Breyer for Once Hews to Traditional Doctrinal Lines
In multiple free-speech cases such as Alvarez and Reed v. Town of
Gilbert,34 Justice Breyer demonstrates aversion to adhering to traditional doctrinal rules and labels while, instead, embracing a jurisprudence of proportionality. As a recent article puts it, Breyer
“appears to distrust the Court’s typical strict scrutiny framework
for evaluating freedom of speech cases, including certain disputes
where viewpoint discrimination is at issue. Frequently, he prefers
employing a ‘proportionality’ balancing test for the vast majority
of cases, refusing to place a heightened burden upon the statute at
issue.”35 Professor Mark Tushnet contends that Breyer is engaged in
a “project of partial de-doctrinalization.”36
Breyer’s 2015 concurrence in Reed, which struck down a content-based sign ordinance under strict scrutiny, is illustrative. Although agreeing with the result, Breyer rejected the “mechanical
use of categories” like strict scrutiny and content discrimination.37
In their place, he argued for “a more basic analysis, which . . . asks
whether the regulation at issue works harm to First Amendment
interests that is disproportionate in light of the relevant regulatory

34

135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).

Benjamin Pomerance, An Elastic Amendment: Justice Stephen G. Breyer’s Fluid
Conceptions of Freedom of Speech, 79 Alb. L. Rev. 403, 506 (2016).
35

36 Mark Tushnet, Justice Breyer and the Partial De-Doctrinalization of Free Speech
Law, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 508, 514 (2014).
37

Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2236 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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objectives.”38 The term content discrimination, for Breyer, sometimes
merits treatment merely “as a rule of thumb, finding it a helpful, but
not determinative legal tool, in an appropriate case, to determine the
strength of a justification.”39
Such squishiness surfaced again in 2015 when Breyer concurred
with a five-justice majority in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar that a rule
banning judges from personally soliciting funds for their election
campaigns survived strict scrutiny.40 Referencing the traditional
categories of constitutional review of strict scrutiny, intermediate
scrutiny, and rational basis, Breyer wrote that he viewed the “Court’s
doctrine referring to tiers of scrutiny as guidelines informing our approach to the case at hand, not tests to be mechanically applied.”41 In
fact, attacking the established doctrinal approach was the only reason Breyer wrote separately in Williams-Yulee: his concurrence was
two sentences long and made no other points.
One thus can’t be faulted for believing that if Breyer someday has
his way, he might import into free-speech cases the same balancing approach to the undue-burden standard he embraced in 2016 in
the abortion-restriction case of Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt.42
Writing there for a five-justice majority, Breyer held that courts must
“consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together
with the benefits those laws confer.”43 Justice Thomas derided this
tack as a “free-form balancing test.”44
In the realm of free expression, Breyer’s Hellerstedt iteration of
the undue-burden test might mean weighing the benefits of a restriction on speech against the burdens the regulation imposes on
both speakers and audiences to, respectively, convey and receive the
speech via other nonrestricted alternative means. In other words, it
might be fairly close to a proportionality analysis.
But in Tam, Breyer toed traditional doctrinal lines safeguarding offensive speech and prohibiting viewpoint discrimination. He didn’t
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

36

Id. at 2235–36.

Id. at 2235 (emphasis added).
135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015).

Id. at 1673 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
Id. at 2309.

Id. at 2324 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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wander off to write a concurrence; in fact, he joined all parts and
sections of the opinion authored by Alito. Perhaps most remarkable, he joined the section of Alito’s opinion in which Alito, who had
dissented in Walker, bluntly described the Breyer-authored majority opinion in that case as likely marking “the outer bounds of the
government speech doctrine.”45 The only thing Breyer did not do in
Tam was join the more decisive, case-killing approach to viewpoint
discrimination adopted in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence. It may
be that Kennedy’s more definitive doctrinal methodology to viewpoint discrimination in Tam is what caused Breyer—unlike fellow
liberal-leaning Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan—not to
join Kennedy.

Political Correctness Loses Its Appeal
Looming in the Tam courthouse, acknowledged or not, was the
controversy over a half-dozen then-canceled trademarks for the
Washington Redskins football team. The fate of those marks would
turn on the result in Tam, so it was not surprising that a friend-ofthe-court brief was filed in the case by several Native American organizations on behalf of the government. That brief asserted, among
other things, that the “use of ‘REDSKINS’—like other racially disparaging sports mascots—inflicts real injury. These mascots demean
and dehumanize the target group; they foster misinformation and
inappropriate stereotype; and they hinder development of self-esteem and other preconditions for social success.”46
Professor Adam Epstein once contended that “if there is a current
professional team name that has sparked legal controversy over the
issue of politically incorrect nicknames, it is the Washington Redskins football team.”47 Thus, if the 1995 battle for Major League Baseball’s crown between the Atlanta Braves and Cleveland Indians was
the “Politically Incorrect World Series,”48 then the fight in Pro-Foot-

45

Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1760 (2017).

Brief of Amici Curiae Native American Organizations in Support of Petitioner,
Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
46

47

Adam Epstein, Maryland Sports Law, 15 U. Denv. Sports & Ent. L.J. 49, 56 (2013).

Michelle B. Lee, Section 2(A) of the Lanham Act as a Restriction on Sports Team
Names: Has Political Correctness Gone Too Far?, 4 Sports Law. J. 65, 65 (1997).
48
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ball, Inc. v. Blackhorse49 was shaping up as the legal Super Bowl over
impolite marks.
When the Supreme Court ruled for The Slants, it therefore was
not surprising one scholar claimed “the Court struck a blow against
political correctness.”50 But it was hardly the first time the Court had
done that.
Specifically, all of the justices involved in Tam—save Alito—ruled
in 2011 for the right of Westboro Baptist Church members to use politically incorrect statements such as “God Hates Fags,” “Thank God
for Dead Soldiers,” and “Pope in Hell.”51 That’s a trio of targets—the
LGBTQ community, military, and Catholic church—of a combined
sensitivity not far off from that of Asians or Native Americans. Sensitivity over the nation’s racial history was also in play in Walker,
although a bare majority there squelched the offending imagery.
Speech inviting offense was nothing new.
In late June 2017, the battle over registering the Redskins’ various marks concluded. The U.S. Justice Department filed a letter on
June 28, 2017, with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
(where Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse was pending) and asked the
court, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Tam, to enter judgment in favor of Pro-Football.52 The next day, Amanda Blackhorse’s
attorney filed a similar letter.53
Thus, in the early months of Donald J. Trump’s tenure as an oftpolitically incorrect and name-calling provocateur president, the
Court confirmed that under our system, there is no right to be free
of offensive expression. And while political turmoil still roils the nation’s capital, its pro football team can—at least in the merchandising space—rest a tad easier after Tam.
49

112 F. Supp. 3d 439 (E.D. Va. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 44 (2016).

50 Noah Feldman, Supreme Court Doesn’t Care What You Say on the Internet, Bloom-

berg View (June 19, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-06-19/
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Beating Back the Government-Speech Doctrine
The government-speech doctrine, Professor Mark Strasser points
out, is not merely new—it dates back fewer than 30 years to the
Court’s decision in Rust v. Sullivan, which upheld a program that denied federal funding to entities that perform abortions54 —but also
underdeveloped.55 Indeed, Professor Papandrea asserts the doctrine
is plagued by a “brief and troubled history.”56
Yet this nascent canon is simultaneously formidable and dangerous.
As I recently wrote, it is “a powerful weapon in a state’s arsenal for expression—one deployable both for promoting the government’s own
viewpoint and, conversely, for squelching the views of others with
which it disagrees”57 provided they can be identified as an extension
of the government’s own expression. As the Supreme Court encapsulated it in 2009, “the Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government speech.”58
The government-speech doctrine, if applied to trademarks, would
permit the PTO to blatantly discriminate against viewpoints when
denying registration. The PTO could unabashedly bully marks that
supposedly disparage groups by not registering them, while conversely promoting marks that laud, praise, or compliment those
same groups by granting them registration.
Before the June 2017 ruling in Tam, but subsequent to the Court’s
using the government-speech doctrine in Walker to censor the Confederate flag, lower courts concluded that the following constitute
government speech: (1) a public school program allowing private
businesses to hang self-promotional, school-partnership banners
from school fences—picture outfield walls at baseball fields—in
exchange for monetary donations;59 (2) the words on food trucks
54
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25 Wm. & Mary Bill of Rts. J. 1239, 1243 (2017).
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Mech v. Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cnty., 806 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied,
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(including the names of businesses painted on them) taking part in
a government-sponsored summer-lunch program held on government-owned property;60 and (3) privately produced tourist guides
and informational brochures distributed at rest stops and welcome
centers owned by Virginia along its highways.61
It is not shocking, then, that one of the most important doctrinal
issues in Tam was whether federally registered trademarks constitute government speech. The PTO argued that federal registration
of marks transforms private expression into government speech—
despite the fact that marks are not only created by private entities,
but also used by those entities to identify themselves, their goods,
and their services. Classifying federally registered trademarks as
government speech would allow the PTO to deny registration to
The Slants mark and, critically, to dodge all First Amendment-based
challenges to its decision.
Under the PTO’s logic in Tam, when you see Nike’s omnipresent
registered “swoosh” trademark on Nike running shorts (“Norts,” as
my undergrads dub them), it is the government—not the maker of
athletic apparel and footwear—that is speaking. The government’s
argument in Tam thus sounded somewhat preposterous, but the
Court in Walker opened the gate for it by holding that the messages
on specialty license plates are those of the government, not those of
either the private entities that design and create them or the private
individuals who choose to display them.
Prior to Walker, the Court in 2009 held in Pleasant Grove City v.
Summum that permanent monuments displayed in public parks constitute government speech, regardless of whether the monuments
are designed, built, and donated by private entities.62 In that case, a
tutoring business but who had previously worked as a porn star. In brief, the person’s
prior occupation was successfully used against him and his current, decidedly nonpornographic speech without raising a First Amendment issue.

60 Wandering Dago, Inc. v. Destito, No. 1:13-cv-1053, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26046
(N.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2016). Labeling such expression government speech allowed the
government to deny a permit, based on its alleged offensiveness, to the Wandering
Dago food truck.
61 Vista-Graphics, Inc. v. Va. Dep’t of Transport., No. 16-1404, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS
5452 (Mar. 29, 2017).

62 555 U.S. 460 (2009). See Patrick M. Garry, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum: The
Supreme Court Finds a Public Display of the Ten Commandments to Be Permissible
Government Speech, 2008-2009 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 271 (2009).
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religious entity called Summum sought to erect a stone monument
bearing its “seven aphorisms” in a public park in Pleasant Grove City,
Utah. When the city rejected Summum’s request, the religious order
sued, claiming violation of the Free Speech Clause and pointing out
that the city had previously accepted a donated monument featuring
the Ten Commandments in the same park. Summum contended that
public parks are traditional public fora for expression—something
that the Court has long acknowledged—and that viewpoint discrimination in such venues violates the First Amendment.
Without dissent, the Court rejected Summum’s arguments. Justice
Alito, penning the Court’s opinion, rebuffed the public forum argument, citing spatial concerns that “public parks can accommodate
only a limited number of permanent monuments.”63 While parks
constitute sacred First Amendment space known as traditional public fora for some types of ephemeral expression—speeches, marches,
rallies, and concerts—they don’t where permanent monuments
are involved. As Alito put it, “it is hard to imagine how a public
park could be opened up for the installation of permanent monuments by every person or group wishing to engage in that form of
expression.”64 Consider, in other words, grounds so crowded and
cluttered by monuments that no space remains for bike paths, ball
fields, swing sets, and the occasional amphitheater.
Beyond the spatial issue, Alito pointed to another factor—public
perception—suggesting that donated, park-located monuments are
government speech. “Public parks are often closely identified in
the public mind with the government unit that owns the land,” he
wrote, adding that:
Government decisionmakers select the monuments that
portray what they view as appropriate for the place in
question, taking into account such content-based factors as
esthetics, history, and local culture. The monuments that are
accepted, therefore, are meant to convey and have the effect
of conveying a government message, and they thus constitute
government speech.65
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But even in Summum, the government-speech doctrine rested on a
shaky foundation. Alito, for example, openly acknowledged “there
may be situations in which it is difficult to tell whether a government entity is speaking on its own behalf or is providing a forum
for private speech.”66 Justice Breyer, who later wrote for the majority in Walker, delivered a concurrence, stressing—per his propensity
for doctrinal squishiness addressed earlier—his “understanding
that the ‘government speech’ doctrine is a rule of thumb, not a rigid
category.”67 And Justice David Souter, citing the doctrine’s relative
recency, cautioned that “it would do well for us to go slow in setting its bounds, which will affect existing doctrine in ways not yet
explored.”68
But in Walker, the five-justice majority threw caution to the wind.
In holding that specialty license plates are government speech, it ignored the fact that, unlike in Summum, there was no spatial scarcity
problem. A seemingly vast number of specialty plates could coexist happily on Texas’s registered vehicles; this was not a public park
with finite acreage. In fact, when Walker was decided, more than 350
different specialty plates were on vehicles registered in the Lone Star
State.69
Instead of focusing on Summum’s scarcity concern, the Breyerauthored majority identified three factors—history, perception,
and control—leading it to find that specialty plates are government
speech. The first factor was the historical use of the medium as a
means for expression. Specifically, Breyer wrote that “the history
of license plates shows that, insofar as license plates have conveyed
more than state names and vehicle identification numbers, they long
have communicated messages from the States.”70
The second variable—this one borrowed from Summum—was
public perception regarding who is speaking: the government or a
private entity? In Walker, Breyer found that because Texas not only issues all specialty plates, but also emblazons each with “Texas” at the
66
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top, viewers likely perceive them as “government IDs.”71 Citing nary
a shred of evidence to support the claim, Breyer also reasoned that “a
person who displays a message on a Texas license plate likely intends
to convey to the public that the State has endorsed that message.”72
Finally, the Walker majority considered the amount of control Texas
exerts over specialty plates. Breyer determined that “Texas maintains
direct control over the messages conveyed on its specialty plates” because its Department of Motor Vehicles Board “must approve every
specialty plate design proposal before the design can appear on a
Texas plate.”73
Justice Alito, joined by the more conservative justices not named
Thomas, scoffed at this approach, contending that the majority’s
“capacious understanding of government speech takes a large and
painful bite out of the First Amendment.”74 Alito asserted that any
person sitting by a Texas highway and watching cars speed by with
specialty plates “bearing the name[s] of a high school, a fraternity
or sorority, the Masons, the Knights of Columbus, the Daughters of
the American Revolution, a realty company, a favorite soft drink, a
favorite burger restaurant, and a favorite NASCAR driver” would
not believe that such sentiments were those of Texas but rather the
cars’ owners.75
Tam marked the first time since Walker that the Court revisited the
government-speech doctrine. Significantly, all eight justices participating in Tam joined the part of the opinion addressing government
speech, thus presenting a unified front on this malleable doctrine.
And although the justices did not jettison the government-speech
doctrine to the dumpster of failed First Amendment principles, they
made several efforts seemingly designed to curb its use. How did
they do that?
First and foremost, the Court flatly rejected the government’s
contention that trademark registration converts private marks
into government speech. As if channeling his snarky inner-Scalia,
Alito posed twin rhetorical questions: “if trademarks represent
71
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government speech, what does the Government have in mind when
it advises Americans to ‘make.believe’ (Sony), ‘Think different’
(Apple), ‘Just do it’ (Nike), or ‘Have it your way’ (Burger King)? Was
the Government warning about a coming disaster when it registered
the mark ‘EndTime Ministries’?”76 The queries pounded home Alito’s point that if registered marks are government speech, then the
government “is unashamedly endorsing a vast array of commercial
products and services.”77
Alito also engaged in some slippery-slope logic about the danger
of calling registered marks government speech: “If federal registration makes a trademark government speech and thus eliminates all
First Amendment protection, would the registration of the copyright for a book produce a similar transformation?”78 Such an outcome would, akin to the PTO’s attack on The Slants for disparaging
Asians, give the U.S. Copyright Office power to discriminate against
original works of authorship that disparage groups. It could, for example, easily deny copyright registration to Bruce Springsteen’s lyrics for “Born in the U.S.A.” because the song’s protagonist is sent off
“to a foreign land to go and kill the yellow man.”
Beyond simply ruling against the PTO, the Court also signaled
that the government-speech doctrine must be reeled in. Notably,
it dubbed the doctrine “susceptible to dangerous misuse,” thereby
necessitating the Court to “exercise great caution before extending
our government speech precedents”79 such as Summum and Walker.
And when it came to Walker—the opinion on which the PTO most
heavily relied—Alito remarked that Walker “likely marks the outer
bounds of the government speech doctrine.”80 Additionally, none of
the three factors deployed in Walker—history, perception, and control—militated in favor of classifying registered trademarks as government speech, Alito wrote.
Perhaps more subtly limiting the doctrine’s future scope was
an Alito-created example suggesting it only applies and permits
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viewpoint discrimination when, in fact, it is the government that
genuinely creates and conveys a message:
During the Second World War, the Federal Government
produced and distributed millions of posters to promote
the war effort. There were posters urging enlistment, the
purchase of war bonds, and the conservation of scarce
resources. These posters expressed a viewpoint, but the First
Amendment did not demand that the Government balance
the message of these posters by producing and distributing
posters encouraging Americans to refrain from engaging in
these activities.81

Initially, this example is critical because it intimates that the
government-speech doctrine is confined to scenarios in which the
government itself produces and conveys a message related to its
own interest. Furthermore, Alito’s example smacks of gravitas—
World War II, the military, national security, and urgently safeguarding the very future of the United States—whereas Walker,
setting aside a Confederate-flag plate, involved the relative frivolity of specialized license plates supporting, among other things,
multiple college sports teams and playing golf.82
Additionally, the message on wartime posters regarding army enlistment and war bonds directly ties to a specific government purpose or end that it hopes to achieve—winning a war. A specialty
plate bearing the phrase “Rather Be Golfing” clearly does not seem
to achieve any government purpose unless, perhaps, the government
81
82
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As Alito rhetorically asked in Walker:
If a car with a plate that says “Rather Be Golfing” passed by at
8:30 am on a Monday morning, would you think: “This is the
official policy of the State – better to golf than to work?” If you
did your viewing at the start of the college football season and
you saw Texas plates with the names of the University of Texas’s out-of-state competitors in upcoming games—Notre Dame,
Oklahoma State, the University of Oklahoma, Kansas State, Iowa
State—would you assume that the State of Texas was officially
(and perhaps treasonously) rooting for the Longhorns’ opponents?
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wants to generate revenue for itself from public courses. But that
possibility is about as much of a legal stretch as was the PTO’s argument in favor of government speech in Tam. Alito’s example thus
intimates that only when truly serious matters are at stake and, in
turn, only when the government is the entity that actually creates
and conveys the message for its own purpose, does it get a pass, via
the government-speech doctrine, on the general rule against viewpoint discrimination.
Furthermore, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Tam buttressed
Alito’s efforts to confine the government-speech doctrine. Specifically, Kennedy called it a “narrow” exception to the general rule
against viewpoint discrimination, contending such narrowness is
necessary “to prevent the government from claiming that every government program is exempt from the First Amendment.”83 Kennedy
had joined Alito’s dissent in Walker, so it is not surprising they were
on the same page in this facet of Tam.
Ultimately, if the Court threw caution to the wind in Walker by
unleashing the government-speech doctrine to sweep up specialty
license plates that are designed, sponsored, and displayed by private
entities and individuals, then in Tam it signaled a desire to keep the
doctrine tightly tethered. Alito, who dissented against the use of the
doctrine in Walker, thereby exacted a small measure of revenge in
Tam.
Walker might turn out to be a dangerous but feel-good (at least for
its liberal-bloc majority) one-off ruling to stop politically incorrect
Confederate flags. Yet it remains good law today, even in the face of
a unanimous effort to halt its momentum in Tam.

Putting the Commercial Speech Doctrine into Play Again
It wasn’t until the 1970s that the Supreme Court extended formal
First Amendment protection to truthful advertisements for lawful
goods and services. Yet, the Court consistently treats commercial
speech less favorably than other types of expression such as political speech. The Court does so by measuring the validity of restrictions on commercial speech against an intermediate—rather than
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strict—scrutiny test that affords greater deference to the government.84 In brief, it generally is easier for the government to regulate
ads for products and services than for it to regulate speech about
other matters.
Justice Thomas, however, has long objected to this second-tier
treatment of commercial expression. One scholar notes that Thomas
has “clearly staked out his claim as a First Amendment defender in
his commercial speech opinions.”85 As Thomas opined in 2001, “I
continue to believe that when the government seeks to restrict truthful speech in order to suppress the ideas it conveys, strict scrutiny is
appropriate, whether or not the speech in question may be characterized as ‘commercial.’”86
Tam provided Thomas with another opportunity to make this
point. That’s because the government argued that trademarks are
commercial speech—basically just names by which companies promote themselves. Applying the usual intermediate-scrutiny test for
commercial-speech cases, a bloc of four justices in Tam—Alito, Roberts, Breyer, and Thomas—held that the disparagement clause failed
to meet this standard. That conclusion is unremarkable.
Thomas, however, penned a concurrence. He agreed the disparagement clause was “unconstitutional even under the less stringent
test” for commercial-speech cases, but he also reiterated his position
that strict scrutiny provides the appropriate test in such disputes.87
84 The U.S. Supreme Court fashioned a four-part test for commercial speech that
requires courts to

determine whether the expression is protected by the First
Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest
is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must
determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive
than is necessary to serve that interest.
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Servs. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980);
see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 572 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(describing “the intermediate scrutiny of Central Hudson”).
85 David L. Hudson, Jr., Justice Clarence Thomas: The Emergence of a CommercialSpeech Protector, 35 Creighton L. Rev. 485, 486 (2002).
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Although Thomas has yet to convince his fellow justices this should
be the case, Alito’s plurality opinion in Tam provides support for that
prospect in the future.
In particular, Alito observed that “the line between commercial and non-commercial speech is not always clear, as this case
illustrates.”88 Such murkiness is unsurprising, largely because the
Court has never satisfactorily defined commercial speech in the first
place. As one scholar bluntly wrote last year, “No one knows exactly
what commercial speech is.”89
The Court even passed on the opportunity to define it 14 years ago
in a case involving Nike that blended commercial speech elements
with political expression.90 There, the Court initially decided to hear
the case, but then dismissed it, invoking the rarely used notion that
its writ of certiorari had been “improvidently granted.”
Despite the definitional difficulties, the commercial versus noncommercial distinction can be pivotal—even outcome-determinative—because a statute is more likely to be struck down under strict
scrutiny than intermediate scrutiny. Alito’s frank acknowledgement
in Tam that the nation’s high court sometimes has trouble separating
commercial and noncommercial speech further opens the door for
scrapping what may be a false dichotomy.
Finally, Justice Kennedy’s Tam concurrence further chops away at
the notion that commercial-speech regulations are always subject
only to intermediate scrutiny. As Kennedy wrote, “discrimination
based on viewpoint, including a regulation that targets speech for
its offensiveness, remains of serious concern in the commercial context” and thus “necessarily invokes heightened scrutiny.”91 In other
words, a statute restricting commercial speech is subjected to something more than just intermediate scrutiny when the regulation is
viewpoint-based. Kennedy explained that neither the term nor category of commercial speech provides “a blanket exemption from the
First Amendment’s requirement of viewpoint neutrality.”92
88
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This logic builds on Kennedy’s 2011 majority opinion in Sorrell
v. IMS Health Inc.93 The Court there struck down a Vermont statute
banning pharmacies from selling, for marketing purposes, records
revealing the prescribing histories of individually identifiable doctors. Those records could be freely sold to others, but not to dataharvesting pharmaceutical marketers who, in turn, would use
the information to try to sell particular drugs to specific doctors.
Kennedy found this disparate treatment of pharmaceutical marketers troubling, reasoning the statute “disfavors marketing, that is,
speech with a particular content. More than that, the statute disfavors specific speakers, namely pharmaceutical manufacturers.”94
The law thus warranted heightened scrutiny—scrutiny greater than
the usual intermediate standard for commercial speech—because it
targeted particular speakers (pharmaceutical salespeople) and their
viewpoints in using that information. The majority, however, backed
down from actually applying strict scrutiny (or something like it)
in Sorrell because it reasoned the statute couldn’t even pass muster
under the lesser intermediate-scrutiny test.95
In summary, the trio of opinions in Tam authored by Justices
Thomas, Breyer, and Kennedy collectively indicates that the future of
an intermediate-scrutiny-based commercial-speech doctrine is perhaps tenuous. And when Tam is viewed more broadly, it illustrates
different definitional difficulties—one in distinguishing government speech from private expression, the other in deciding what is
commercial speech—now plaguing two relatively recent doctrines.

Viewpoint Discrimination: Contested Meaning and Effect
Although all eight justices in Tam agreed that the disparagement
clause unconstitutionally discriminated against a viewpoint, they
split 4-4 on when viewpoint discrimination exists and when it is fatal
to a statute. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor,
and Kagan, provided—in my view—a sharper, more textbook-like
definition and emphasized the statute-killing power of the rule
against viewpoint discrimination. Justice Alito, joined by Justices
93
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speech inquiry or a stricter form of judicial scrutiny is applied.” Id. at 571.
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Roberts, Thomas, and Breyer, took a more muddled approach. Because this rift may affect future cases, it helps to explore it in greater
detail, starting with Kennedy’s opinion and then Alito’s take.
What is viewpoint discrimination? For Kennedy, it is a subset or
subtype of a larger category of discrimination called content-based
discrimination. In brief, content-based discrimination targets a specific subject matter, while viewpoint discrimination slices and dices
within that subject matter and, as Kennedy wrote, singles “out a
subset of messages for disfavor based on the views expressed.”96
Put slightly differently by Kennedy, a viewpoint-based law impermissibly attempts “to remove certain ideas or perspectives from a
broader debate” about a subject.97 The First Amendment mandates
viewpoint neutrality by the government—the converse of viewpoint
discrimination.
The classroom example I use to illustrate this point compares
two hypothetical laws restricting speech about abortion. Abortion,
to use Kennedy’s words, is “the relevant subject” in both laws. One
law restricts all speech about abortion and thus reflects content-based
discrimination. The other law restricts only pro-choice speech about
abortion (but not pro-life speech or other perspectives on abortion),
thereby embodying viewpoint discrimination.
Applying this logic to the disparagement clause, Kennedy explained that the subjects targeted were “persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols.” About such subjects, however,
the clause permitted registration only for “a positive or benign mark
but not a derogatory one. The law thus reflects the Government’s
disapproval of a subset of messages it finds offensive. This is the essence of viewpoint discrimination.”98 As applied to The Slants case,
the clause allowed registering marks lauding Asian-Americans, but
not ones disparaging them. It was that simple.
The impact of such viewpoint discrimination was, in turn, outcome determinative for the Kennedy bloc. Viewpoint discrimination, he emphasized, is “so potent that it must be subject to rigorous
constitutional scrutiny,” regardless of whether the speech offends
audiences or is classified as commercial. “To the extent trademarks
96
97
98
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qualify as commercial speech, they are an example of why that
term or category does not serve as a blanket exemption from the
First Amendment’s requirement of viewpoint neutrality,” Kennedy
wrote.99
That was an important point that divided the Court. Justices
Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan believe that viewpointbased laws targeting commercial speech are subject to “rigorous”
scrutiny. Thus, they did not join in the part of Justice Alito’s opinion
in which he, Roberts, Thomas, and Breyer analyzed the disparagement clause under the deferential intermediate scrutiny that typically applies in commercial-speech cases.
Kennedy identified only one exception to the principle that viewpoint discrimination is verboten—namely, when the governmentspeech doctrine applies. As he put it, “the Court’s precedents have
recognized just one narrow situation in which viewpoint discrimination is permissible: where the government itself is speaking or recruiting others to communicate a message on its behalf.”100 Because
that lone exception to the rule against viewpoint discrimination did
not apply in Tam, The Slants prevailed and the PTO lost.
The bottom line for the Kennedy bloc in Tam is that the presence
of viewpoint discrimination, coupled with the absence of government speech, rendered “unnecessary any extended treatment of
other questions raised by the parties.” The quoted part of that sentence jabs at the ink spilled by Alito, Roberts, Thomas, and Breyer
in considering the government’s back-up, ill-fated arguments that
Tam should have been treated either as a government-subsidy case
or under a proposed new doctrine for “government-program” cases.
Justice Alito’s analysis of viewpoint discrimination is more problematic for two reasons. First, and as noted above, although Alito
found that the disparagement clause discriminated on the basis of
viewpoint, he nonetheless analyzed it under the intermediate-scrutiny test for commercial speech cases rather than a more rigorous
standard. His choice didn’t affect the outcome in Tam because the
Alito bloc found that the clause failed even under intermediate scrutiny. It does, however, reflect a key difference between the Kennedy
and Alito blocs going forward regarding the correct standard when
99
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a law targeting commercial speech also discriminates on the basis of
viewpoint.
Second, Alito failed to provide a clear formula for determining
when a law is viewpoint-based. He simply wrote that “[o]ur cases
use the term ‘viewpoint’ discrimination in a broad sense”; the disparagement clause was viewpoint-based because “[g]iving offense
is a viewpoint.”101 Alito then cited a laundry list of cases, including
the Court’s flag-burning decision of Texas v. Johnson102 and its ruling
protecting pornographer Larry Flynt’s ability to luridly poke fun at
Reverend Jerry Falwell in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,103 standing for
the proposition that an idea cannot be censored simply because it
offends.
My worry is that Alito muddled two distinct doctrinal strands—
one generally prohibiting censorship based on offensiveness and one
banning viewpoint discrimination—in finding that “giving offense
is a viewpoint.” Consider Cohen v. California, the “Fuck the Draft”
opinion noted at the start of the essay and a quintessential offensive
speech case. The statute there targeted “offensive conduct,” and the
Court framed the issue as whether California could “properly remove this offensive word from the public vocabulary.”
But if offense equals a viewpoint, as Alito has it in Tam, then it’s
surprising the Court in Cohen failed to analyze the California statute
as an instance of viewpoint discrimination. There was, most notably,
no examination by the Court of whether a person could freely say
pro-draft messages in a courthouse but not make anti-draft statements. That’s how a viewpoint-discrimination analysis likely would
have unfolded in Cohen.
Instead, the Court focused on (1) the need to protect the emotive—
not simply cognitive—function of speech, (2) the self-help remedy
for those offended of averting their eyes from Paul Robert Cohen’s
jacket-worn message, and (3) the vagueness problems with defining
offensiveness. Justice John Marshall Harlan II remarked for the majority on this last point that
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while the particular four-letter word being litigated here is
perhaps more distasteful than most others of its genre, it is
nevertheless often true that one man’s vulgarity is another’s
lyric. Indeed, we think it is largely because governmental
officials cannot make principled distinctions in this area that
the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so largely to
the individual.104

The Court in Cohen, however, did recognize that offensiveness
could serve as an excuse for discriminating against a viewpoint. As
Harlan pointed out, “we cannot indulge the facile assumption that
one can forbid particular words without also running a substantial
risk of suppressing ideas in the process. Indeed, governments might
soon seize upon the censorship of particular words as a convenient
guise for banning the expression of unpopular views.”105
In other words, offense and viewpoint are not always the same.
The word “fuck” is what gave offense in Cohen, not Paul Robert
Cohen’s anti-draft viewpoint. Taking offense at a word (“fuck”) is
not the same as discriminating against the viewpoint in which that
word is used (“fuck the draft”). “Fuck,” standing alone without “the
draft,” is not a viewpoint. Giving or taking offense therefore is not
always a viewpoint.
For Alito, Tam was more about protecting offensiveness than it
was about prohibiting viewpoint discrimination. Alito’s discussion
of viewpoint discrimination in Part III, Section C—a section the Kennedy bloc did not join—covered only two paragraphs before Alito
segued out by citing a list of right-to-offend cases, including Johnson
and Falwell.106 It’s as if Alito tossed in a few sentences about viewpoint discrimination as a sop to Kennedy, who engaged in a lengthy
analysis of that problem.
Perhaps most telling is the fact that Alito omitted any reference to
viewpoint discrimination in announcing the Court’s judgment at the
opening of the opinion. He wrote only that the disparagement clause
“violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. It offends
a bedrock First Amendment principle: Speech may not be banned
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on the ground that it expresses ideas that offend.”107 For Alito, Tam
was about protecting offensive expression from the forces of political
correctness.
Contrast that with the second paragraph of Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence, which reads: “As the Court is correct to hold, [the disparagement clause] constitutes viewpoint discrimination—a form
of speech suppression so potent that it must be subject to rigorous
constitutional scrutiny. The Government’s action and the statute on
which it is based cannot survive this scrutiny.”108 For Kennedy, Tam
was about preventing viewpoint discrimination in the marketplace
of ideas.
This may all seem like two sides of the same legal coin. I doubt,
however, that Justice Kennedy thought so when he engaged in the
kind of lengthy and thoughtful analysis of viewpoint discrimination
that Justice Alito’s opinion lacked.

Faith in the Marketplace of Ideas
Back in 1919, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. imported the
marketplace-of-ideas theory of free expression into First Amendment jurisprudence in Abrams v. United States.109 Writing in dissent,
Holmes contended that
when men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe
the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that
the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market.110

Nearly a century later, Justice Kennedy favorably invoked the
marketplace metaphor in Tam to explain why viewpoint discrimination is wrong and why, in turn, the disparagement clause is

107
108
109
110

54

Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017).

Id. at 1765 (2017) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
250 U.S. 616 (1919).

Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).

Beyond Trademarks and Offense
unconstitutional. “By mandating positivity, the law here might
silence dissent and distort the marketplace of ideas,” Kennedy
opined.111
Similarly, Kennedy’s criticism of removing “certain ideas and perspectives from a broader debate” reflects the notion that the consummate marketplace of ideas is a forum for debating all ideas and
perspectives. The participants in this ideal marketplace are also rational and thoughtful, with Kennedy confidently suggesting that an
initial hostile reaction to a message “may prompt further reflection,
leading to a more reasoned, more tolerant position.” Ultimately,
Kennedy closed his concurrence with a deep bow to faith in marketplace discussion rather than to trust in the government:
A law that can be directed against speech found offensive to
some portion of the public can be turned against minority
and dissenting views to the detriment of all. The First
Amendment does not entrust that power to the government’s
benevolence. Instead, our reliance must be on the substantial
safeguards of free and open discussion in a democratic
society.112

Some, of course, will consider such assuredness in the marketplace of ideas hopelessly naïve. We live in an era in which instantaneous outrage (not reason or reflection) rules in response to
offending tweets and “free and open discussion” is replaced by often
unhinged—albeit, certainly free and open—verbal confrontation.
What’s more, marketplace competition of ideas hasn’t driven out the
falsity that is fake news—the great political and journalistic panic of
2016–17—and replaced it with the truth. Many would also argue the
marketplace of ideas already is badly distorted by the forces of concentrated, corporate media ownership, so what’s the harm in a little
government intervention when it comes to registering trademarks?
But the Court’s continuing invocation of the metaphor is testament, against all else, that it is an aspirational model for which society should strive and upon which the government should not encroach or interfere. It may be a flawed theory, but it clearly captures
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why the government cannot jettison ideas and perspectives it disdains from the hurly-burly of today’s speech environment.

Final Thoughts
Although the Court in Tam struck down the Lanham Act’s disparagement clause, it did not address the constitutionality of another
facet of the same statute that allows the PTO to deny registration
to marks featuring “immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter.”113
This clause has been used by the PTO to reject registration for sexually themed trademarks such “1-800-JACK-OFF” and “JACK-OFF”
for a dial-a-porn company,114 as well as the phrase “Cock Sucker”
accompanying a drawing of a crowing rooster for a company
selling—you guessed it—rooster-shaped chocolate lollipops.115
Unpacking the phrase “immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter” is important. Prohibiting registration for deceptive marks is not
problematic because the First Amendment does not safeguard commercial speech that is false or misleading. But refusing registration
for immoral or scandalous marks is troubling, given the subjective,
value-laden judgments regarding the meaning of those words. In
particular, the PTO’s use of “scandalous” is often interchangeable
with the term “vulgar,”116 which circles back to the Supreme Court’s
observation in Cohen that “one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.”117
A facial challenge on void-for-vagueness grounds to the part of 15
U.S.C. § 1052(a) targeting immoral and scandalous marks thus might
provide another route for further rolling back the PTO’s authority
over offensive speech.118
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On the one hand, the Supreme Court in Tam virtually teed up such
a future challenge. That’s because Justice Alito, in a part of the opinion joined by all of the justices except Thomas, dropped a footnote
pointing out that “the PTO has acknowledged that the guidelines
‘for determining whether a mark is scandalous or disparaging are
somewhat vague and the determination of whether a mark is scandalous or disparaging is necessarily a highly subjective one.’”119
On the other hand, the Supreme Court’s current test for obscenity is replete with moralistic terms such as “prurient interest” and
“patently offensive.”120 Additionally, “prurient interest” is defined
by the Court with the equally subjective and moralistic notion of
“a shameful or morbid interest in sex.”121 And, as noted earlier, the
Court recently dodged a First Amendment challenge to the FCC’s
problematic definition of indecency.122 In brief, the Court demonstrates some tolerance for subjectivity and ambiguity when it comes
to regulating sexual matters. Thus, whether a challenge to the PTO’s
authority over immoral and scandalous marks would be successful
with the Supreme Court is unclear, but Alito’s footnote in Tam certainly encourages the effort.
Although Tam addressed a federal statute, the Court’s ruling has
direct implications for state trademark laws too. That’s because dozens of state statutes also target disparaging trademarks and mirror
the language of the federal disparagement clause struck down in
Tam. For instance, Florida Statute § 495.021(b) allows Sunshine State
officials to deny registration to any mark that “consists of or comprises matter which may disparage . . . persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or
disrepute.” Statutes in other populous states such as California and
New York contain the same language.123 These laws are now ripe
for First Amendment challenges, with Tam serving as precedent for
holding them unconstitutional.
119 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1756, n.5 (2017) (emphasis added) (quoting In re
In Over Our Heads, Inc., 16 USPQ 2d 1653, 1654 (TTAB 1990) (brackets and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
120
121
122
123

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).

Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 504 (1985).
Supra notes 3–8 and accompanying text.

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 14205 (2017); N.Y. Gen. Bus. § 360-a (Consol. 2017).

57

Cato Supreme Court Review
Ultimately, from a free-speech perspective, there is much to praise
about the ruling in Tam. It vindicates and reaffirms key First Amendment principles regarding both offensive expression and viewpoint
discrimination. It also rebuffs the government-speech doctrine in
the realm of trademarks, while attempting to curb its expansion elsewhere. Furthermore, facets of the opinions of Justices Alito, Thomas,
and Kennedy collectively raise questions about the future of an intermediate-scrutiny-based commercial speech doctrine. Additionally,
Tam reinforces the Court’s continued respect for the marketplace of
ideas. What’s more, Justice Alito came to the aid of offensive expression, while Justice Breyer didn’t stray off the beaten doctrinal path.
That’s just about a First Amendment home run, with the unfortunate
4-4 split among the justices regarding viewpoint discrimination the
only item keeping the ball inside the fence for a triple.
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